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Summary 
 
FOR A SMALLER BUT BETTER GOVERNMENT. 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY 
IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 
J.G.A. van Mierlo, Universiteit Maastricht 
 
In an age of transition of CEE-countries from the communist command economy to a capitalist 
market (or mixed) economy, the debate on the relation between government and the market 
goes on but enters a new stage. On the one hand, a strong market needs a strong government. 
Both go hand in hand. On the other hand, the provision of public services can substantially be 
improved by making use of so-called ‘market devices’, either in the private sector but or and 
even inside the public sector. Some labels of the debate are: ‘marketisation’ of public services; 
public services and market mechanisms; competition, contracting and the New Public 
Management. 
 In this chapter the new relations between government and the market in an age of 
transition are analysed. We start the argument with an analysis of bureaucracy as problem of 
big government. Then, three ways to fight bureaucracy are explored. The debate between 
reinvented versus rediscovered government is covered next. Subsequently, we discuss some 
problems for entrepreneurial government. Four market devices for public service delivery are 
analysed shortly and four fundamental questions are raised. Finally, contingency conditions are 
discussed. The chapter closes with a short conclusion about the ultimate goal and lessons 
learned. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In an age of transition of CEE-countries from the communist command economy to a capitalist 
market (or mixed) economy, the debate on the relation between government and the market 
goes on but enters a new stage. On the one hand, a strong market needs a strong government. 
Both go hand in hand. On the other hand, the provision of public services can substantially be 
improved by making use of so-called ‘market devices’, either in the private sector but or and 
even inside the public sector. Some labels of the debate are: ‘marketisation’ of public services; 
public services and market mechanisms; competition, contracting and the New Public 
Management (see Walsh, 1995). 
 In this chapter the new relations between government and the market in an age of 
transition are analysed. We start the argument with an analysis of bureaucracy as problem of big 
government (section 2). In section 3 three ways to fight bureaucracy are explored. The debate 
between reinvented versus rediscovered government is covered in section 4. In section 5 we 
discuss some problems for entrepreneurial government. In the next section four market devices 
for public service delivery are analysed shortly. Four fundamental questions are raised in 
section 7. Contingency conditions are mentioned in section 8. The chapter closes with a short 
conclusion about the ultimate goal and lessons learned in section 9.           
 
 
2. Bureaucracy as Problem of Big Government 
 
The classical organisation of government is Bureaucracy. The theoretical model of the 
bureaucratic organisation has been developed by Max Weber (Weber, 1947). Bureaucracy is a 
formal organisational structure, featured by differentiation (division of labour), hierarchy and 
positions based on expertise. The classical bureaucracy is the best example of a vertical and 
hierarchical organisation. The bureaucratic model of Weber contains both structural and 
behavioural characteristics. Behavioural characteristics are present in various devices of 
discipline and control. Formalisation and objectivisation of rules and regulations result in 
bureaucratic behaviour. The bureaucrat does his job precisely and consistently. Citizens are 
treated anonymously and impartially, 'sine ira et studio'. In this model, structural features are the 
most important. As structural features become more dominant, the bureaucratic organisation 
becomes more rational. 
 However, this does not hold for behavioural characteristics. Preciseness, consistency 
and impersonality may at a certain point prevent the realisation of formal objectives of the 
organisation; structural characteristics as differentiation, hierarchy and recruitment on basis of 
expertise may coincide with imprecise, inconsistent and personal behaviour of the bureaucrat. 
This is one reason why the classical Weberian model of bureaucracy is no longer dominant in 
scientific thinking about bureaucratic organisations, but has been confronted with other 
bureaucracy models, in particular the economic model of bureaucracy (see Niskanen, 1971). In 
the economic approach, bureaucracies are determined by budget systems, by not for profit-
motives and by policy supplies as package deals (and not on a quid pro quo basis).   
 Four changes have taken place in the practical operation and functioning of government 
bureaucracies. The classical distinction between politics and administration (invented and 
advocated by Woodrow Wilson, the founder of modern public administration) is disappearing. 
Politics was considered to take the policy-decisions, bureaucracy was responsible for policy-
implementation. However, bureaucrats have a large advantage in expertise above politicians. 
Hence they have substantial political influence and power in the stage of policy preparation. In 
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the implementation stage they also have much power and discretionary privileges, as technical 
implementation prescriptions cannot be determined completely and precisely in the decision-
making stage. 
 Secondly, there has been an enormous quantitative growth of government. Big 
government resulted from a continuously increasingly appeal since 1945 on government as 
modern 'problem solver'. The expansion of the welfare state since the nineteen fifties was 
another factor in favour of big government. 
 Thirdly, the organisation of government has developed its own dynamics, both in 
quantitative and qualitative sense. The growth of government resulted in more growth, in 
particular as constantly new policies have to be developed and implemented in order to repair 
problems of previous policies that proved not to work (the phenomenon of 'policy-
accumulation'). In this way, government was not longer considered to be a solution to the 
problem, but increasingly became part and even cause of the problem (as president Reagan 
stated in his inaugural address in 1980). 
 Fourthly, during the nineteen eighties government itself became subject to severe 
criticisms as a result of alleged seize of power by the bureaucracy, the quantitative growth of 
government, and the lacking problem solving capacities of government. After a long period of 
quantitative changes of government (more bureaucrats, more budgets, more government 
organisations, more government activities), the odds changed towards qualitative change of 
government: a smaller but better government became the parole in politics and society. 
 Citizens do not longer accept a Big Government that costs large amounts of taxpayer’s 
money and does not solve the problems it is expected to solve. Citizens do also not longer 
accept that government organisations treat them as passive objects of public policies, instead of 
as active consumers, clients and even co-makers of public policies. Just as in modern society, in 
modern government the vertical and hierarchical command model of organisation is no longer 
valid. This classical model is substituted by a more modern model of horizontal and democratic 
organisation of government, in which negotiation and consultation are vehicles for decision-
making (see Ostrom, 1973). Modern government is changing in reaction to the changing 
environment of government, i.e. modern society. 
 
 
3. Three Ways to Fight Bureaucracy  
 
Three answers and solutions can be formulated to these problems of Big Government. These 
three answers are at least partially determined by political ideology. The first answer is a radical 
one: the complete abolishment of government and a complete fallback on the market and price 
mechanism. However, we all know that there is still such a thing as 'market failure'. 
'Government failure' is not a sufficient condition for surrender to ‘market fetishism (see Wolfe, 
1979; 1983; 1988). The second answer is more moderate one: more political’ control on 
government and bureaucracy. Political reformers, faced with the power of a bureaucracy, are 
always trying to solve this problem by making proposals to sharpen the external control of the 
bureaucracy: better organisation of parliament, more guidance and control of ministries and 
departments by ministers, better financial management, an ombudsman, systematic policy 
analysis, and so on. However, these measures are bureaucratic themselves and hence will have 
little effect: as limited as internal control of the bureaucracy is, will be external control. 
Bureaucracy cannot be fought with more bureaucracy. 
 Public choice-analysis of the bureaucracy problem teaches us on important lesson: that 
the heart of the problem lies in two characteristics of bureaucracy: hierarchy and monopoly. The 
 5 
combination of both is extremely dangerous, because it results in bureaucratic power as is 
shown by the analysis of Van den Doel and Van Velthoven (1993: pp. 148-174). Hence, the 
hierarchical structure and the monopoly position of the government bureaucracy should be 
demolished. Monopoly should be substituted by competition and hierarchy by democracy. 
 The concept of 'public entrepreneurship' provides promising possibilities for radical 
reform of the government bureaucracy, especially by injecting mechanisms of competition and 
democratic control into public organisations. Public entrepreneurship seems to provide an 
escape from the dilemma between market fetishism on the one hand and bureaucratisation on 
the other hand. An analytical distinction has to be made between two levels of public 
entrepreneurship: the level of the public organisation and the level of the public official. At the 
first level, the bureaucratic organisation of government has to be changed into a more 
entrepreneurial one. At the second level, the bureaucratic official and department within the 
government have to be changed into a more entrepreneurial one. Entrepreneurship as a 
characteristic of public organisations and as a characteristic of public officials can be connected 
by the sociological role-concept. 
 
 
4. Reinvented versus Rediscovered Government 
 
In a book that attracted worldwide attention, the American authors David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler (1992) developed an extensive argument for a complete transformation of bureaucratic 
government into entrepreneurial government. In their view, government should not be 
abolished, but should be 'reinvented'. The classical model of government, employed in the 
Progressive Era and New Deal, is one of in-house program implementation and service delivery 
by hierarchically organized administrative departments, run by professional managers in accord 
with operational rules and fiscal checks. According to Osborne and Gaebler, this model was 
originally adopted to rid the country of inept patronage machines (just as in Europe the classical 
model of bureaucracy was introduced to get rid of inadequate political favouritism!). However, 
in this era of global competition, instant communication, a knowledge-based economy, and 
niche-markets, such industrial era bureaucracy is alleged to produce mediocracy, inflexibility, 
and an obsession with control: ‘controlitis’. 
 To replace this model of government, a new form of 'governance' should be created at 
all levels of government. In the United States, a programme for reform of federal government 
(NPR, the National Performance Review) under supervision of vice-president Al Gore has been 
launched in 1993, which has been inspired by the idea of 'entrepreneurial government', i.e., a 
government that is adaptable, responsive, efficient, and effective. Such a government must be 
able to produce high quality goods and services, be responsive to customers, be led by 
persuasion and incentives rather than command, empower clients, and - above all - be 
entrepreneurial. 
 Osborne and Gaebler formulated the following list of Ten Principles to achieve this 
fundamental transformation of the organisation of government. 
1. Government should skilfully select alternatives to in-house delivery, such as contracting out, 
entering into public-private partnerships, and utilizing such devices as vouchers, volunteers, 
seed money, and quid pro quos. 
2. Professional administrators should not run all aspects of programs but instead empower 
clients to participate in management by means of governing councils and management teams. 
3. Competition should be injected into the governing process by such methods as bidding for 
tasks, internal rivalry among subunits, and competition among services for clients. 
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4. Agencies should minimize the number of rules by which they operate. To be eliminated are 
line-item budgeting, year-end fund expiration, and detailed job classifications. Once freed up, 
the organizations should dedicate themselves to a clear, one-niche mission. 
5. Review of agency-performance and fund allocation should be based not on program inputs 
but on policy outcomes. 
6. Clients must be regarded as customers. This calls for giving them choices, surveying their 
attitudes, making services convenient, training employees in customer contact, test marketing, 
and providing 800 numbers and suggestion forms. 
7. Governments should not just spend money, but earn it as well, for example from use fees, 
shared savings, enterprise funds, entrepreneurial loan pools, and internally competitive profit 
centres. 
8. Governments should not just deliver services to meet ends, but prevent needs from arising in 
the first place. Examples are fire prevention, preventative maintenance, recycling, antismoking 
campaigns, accrual accounting, and regional government. 
9. Centralized institutions should become decentralized, with hierarchical control giving way to 
devolved authority, teamwork, participatory management, labour-management cooperation, 
quality circles, and employee development programs. 
10. Governments should not attempt to achieve ends only by command and control, but also by 
restructuring markets. Illustrations are subsidized health insurance, incentives for downtown 
investment, and emissions trading. 
 So far these 'Ten Principles for Entrepreneurial Government', which have been 
formulated in somewhat exaggerating terms. Not the formulations, however, but the contents of 
these principles are relevant for discussion and criticisms. This brings us to the pros and cons of 
the central philosophy of public entrepreneurship. The concept of public entrepreneurship has 
been criticised severely by many, in particular by specialists in the field of public administration 
(see the special volume of Public Administration Review on 'Reinventing Government', 
March/April 1994). In a book review in Public Administration Review of Osborne and 
Gaebler's Reinventing Government, Charles Goodsell (1993: pp. 85-87) criticises their 
approach and ideas of entrepreneurial government and public entrepreneurship in a rather 
fundamental way. In reaction to their ten principles of public entrepreneurship, Goodsell 
formulated his 'Ten Principles of Rediscovered Government'. 
1. Through their elected representatives, the people are in charge of American governance, not 
the entrepreneurs. 
2. Government is intended to serve the public interest, not create unspent reserves or feed 
entrepreneurial egos. 
3. Government must operate according the Constitution and laws of the land, not niche mission 
statements. 
4. Government can enter into partnerships with private entities as long as it is the senior partner. 
5. Government should be flexible and innovative, but also publicly accountable. 
6. Performance results must be demanded in government, but also respect for the public 
employees who make them happen. 
7. In government, private managerial conduct must comply with the non-private ideals of equal 
opportunity and open scrutiny. 
8. Simplification of rules is fine, but not dilution of the principles of comparable treatment and 
due process. 
9. Reduction of fiscal constraints is acceptable, but not a lessening of requirements for 
stewardship over the public's money. 
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10. Public problems should be dealt with publicly, but not as to give away the store to those 
who will benefit. 
 In sum, Goodsell argues that public administration is not obsolete. Nobody has really 
argued it is, not even public choice theorists. However, if there would raise conflicts and 
contradictions between Osborne and Gaebler's ten principles for public entrepreneurship and 
reinventing government and Goodsell's ten principles for classical bureaucracy and 
rediscovering government, Goodsell makes his choice. That is one way to solve a potential 
dilemma. 
 A better way is to investigate seriously the validity and presence of such contradictions, 
to determine which principle has priority in case of inevitable conflicts, and to balance and 
compromise between both principles if possible. The real question is, whether both approaches, 
resulting in two different lists of ten principles, can be reconciled. If such reconciliation is not 
possible, a lexicographic ordering of the two approaches could be considered, in which the one 
point of view functions as a prerequisite for the other. Economists have learned to optimise, not 
to maximise, but given the amount of available information optimising and maximising is the 
same thing! 
 
 
5. Problems of Entrepreneurial Government   
  
Entrepreneurial government functions as the organisational framework within which the 
entrepreneurial bureaucrat operates. On the micro-level of public service delivery this results in 
an increasing demand for more client-orientation, and in connection with this 
professionalisation and productivity improvement of public organisations. Client-orientation, 
professionalisation and productivity improvement are the key-concepts, by which the 
entrepreneurial bureaucrat in an entrepreneurial government organisation can be characterized. 
For a better understanding of the importance of the entrepreneurial bureaucrat, the following 
roles of government should be distinguished: 
Role 1: the government as regulator of society as a whole; 
Role 2: the government as financier, sponsor or subsidiser of activities in the non-commercial 
non-profit sector and in the commercial private sector; 
Role 3: the government as provider of public goods and services to citizens, or as public service 
deliverer. 
Concepts as 'government as entrepreneur' and 'entrepreneurship in the public sector' refer to the 
third role of government that of public service provider. 
 The organisation of government, however, has some specific organisational features, 
which cause some serious problems for using market devices in public service delivery. The 
following factors may impede improvement of public service delivery. 
-Government organisations have to serve several target groups of the population who have to be 
reckoned with and between whom sometimes choices have to be made. 
-The translation of public tasks into specific public products is difficult: often more abstract 
varieties of public services are at stake, which hardly can be recognised as products. 
-Many times there is no clear demand for public goods and services: they are imposed on the 
citizens, resulting in forced and not in voluntary consumption. Sometimes these public services 
are producing favourable conditions, sometimes they are innovative. 
-The organisation of government has its own specific culture of rules, habits, and laws. This 
legal culture offers little space for client-oriented formulations. 
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-In the organisation of government incentives to client-orientation are lacking. in case of a 
government monopoly, the client is dependent on the government an not the other way around; 
-By nature, the bureaucrat is a-commercial: he is not recruited on basis of his sales capacities 
and he is not trained in acquiring such capacities. 
-Selling policies is in the public sector limited to providing information, but in particular in 
government organisations this activity has a very low status. 
-When several target groups of the population are at stake, government organisations have 
serious problems in making strategic choices (target group selection), because for instance this 
might be considered as discrimination. 
-Government is considered by the citizens as an organisational unity, whereas at the bottom 
level of government organisations, where contacts with clients are concentrated (street level 
bureaucracy), internal coordination is lacking or is insufficient. 
-Government is not accustomed to think in terms of results: in many cases measurement of 
government performance is difficult.         
 
 
6. Four Market Devices for Public Service Delivery 
  
A variety of market devices have been proposed and adopted for the reform of state bureaucracy 
in the Western world (Walsh, 1995: pp. xvii ff.). The first is the introduction of pricing and 
charging for public services, in order to create market pressures on politicians and officials. 
More services are charged for, and charges have been brought closer to those that might apply 
in a free market. There have been attempts to give the users of public services the ability to act 
as customers with choices through the use of real money, or by the proxy of vouchers. There is 
extensive development of pricing and charging within public service organisations, involving a 
move from ‘hierarchies’ to  ‘hierarchies with markets’. Finally, internal privatisation is on the 
move. This comes all together into ‘the power of the purse’, that empowers citizens as clients to 
demand and receive ‘value for money’. 
 The second mechanism for changing public service management is the development of 
contract. The simplest form of contract is the buying in of services from private providers. The 
public organisation may be allowed to compete with private providers in a market-testing 
programme (or work even may be externalised). Contract is used to characterise relationships 
within the organisation as those with private providers; authority relations are being redefined 
as contracts. Contract is also linked with performance measurement to produce an individual 
focus on the public sector worker or department, making the employment contract more like 
that for purchase on the market. The public service is becoming a ‘nexus of contracts’, rather 
than a bureaucratic hierarchy. 
 The use of prices and contracts is being extended though the development of internal 
markets, for instance in the National Health Service in the UK but increasingly in other public 
services. Purchaser and provider are separated. They relate to each other through quasi-
contracts, with prices and charges operating to ensure the match of demand and supply. Internal 
purchasers are increasingly free to buy where they want, which puts downward pressure on 
service costs and creates incentives for productivity and efficiency growth. As purchasers act as 
surrogates for ultimate users, they are forced to be more explicit about the rationing decisions 
they make. 
 Finally, large bureaucratic public service organisations are being broken down into 
smaller independent units, with autonomy to operate relatively freely. Schools, colleges, 
hospitals and many other public service deliverers have been allowed more independence from 
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supervising authorities. Their autonomy has been increased through the creation of internal 
agencies operating at ‘arm’s length’. These independent or internally autonomous agencies 
operate under quasi-market principles, relating to each other through contracting and the 
purchase of services. They are monitored and controlled through performance measurement and 
targets. The development of such ‘devolved control’ makes the public service becoming a more 
or less integrated network of organisations that relate to contract and price rather than authority 
and command. 
 Using these four market devices, one creates a market for public services that is 
‘managed’. There is a close regulation of the way such a managed market operates and the 
control of the pattern of change. What is emerging then is a new form of organisation that is 
neither a pure market nor a pure hierarchy, but which lies rather uncomfortably between the 
two. CEE-countries in transition may learn from the experiences of marketisation of public 
services in West-Europe.                                              
 
 
7. Four Fundamental Questions 
 
Alternative arrangements for providing public services have been are emerging at high speed 
since the nineteen nineties everywhere in the Western world. Savas (1987: pp. 58 ff.) points out, 
that the construction of these alternative arrangements involves four separate questions to be 
answered: 
1. Who is the arranger? The arranger selects, assigns and authorizes the producer. 
2. Who is the producer? The producer delivers the service to the customers. 
3. Who is the consumer? The consumer takes the services delivered by the producers. 
4. Who is the financier? The financier pays for the services delivered by the producers to the 
consumers. 
 Nowadays, these four functions in public service delivery are no longer performed 
simultaneously by the government and its bureaucratic organisations in a monopoly position. 
Every function can be performed by different organisations, be it pure public, semi-public or 
non-profit, and pure private. Hence mixed and complicated institutional arrangements emerge. 
This development offers new chances and possibilities for public or bureaucratic entrepreneurs, 
who can play an important role in the external organisation of such mixed and complicated 
institutional arrangements. Savas end up in 1987 with an inventory of about fifteen alternative 
institutional arrangements between pure public and pure market. A few years later Osborne and 
Gaebler (1993) produced an even far longer list of about fifty alternative institutional 
arrangements between government and the market. Therefore the inevitable conclusion must be, 
that there is not a one-dimensional choice between government and the market. Depending on 
the answers given to the four fundamental questions many institutional arrangements for public 
service delivery are available!       
 
 
8. Contingency Conditions for Success 
 
Success or failure of the application of the four market devices is at least partially determined 
by so-called ‘contingencies’ between the public service delivery system and its economic, social 
and political environment (see Minogue, Polidano and Hume, 1998). There are several 
contingencies for success or failure, some of them located in the public sector of the economy 
and some of them in the private sector (see Van Mierlo, 1998). 
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 In the public sector a Democratic Constitution must be present that protects citizens’ and 
human rights against government abuse of power. In addition, the ‘Rule of Law’ must be 
reigning: government decisions must be taken by law. Principles of ‘Good Governance’ should 
be established in the organisation and management of the public sector. Finally, ‘Transparency’ 
and ‘Absence of Corruption’ must be present. In the private sector a ‘Good Working Market 
System’ is a necessary prerequisite. Furthermore, there should be a ‘Good Working Financial 
and Banking System’.  Finally, business should be characterised by good working principles of 
‘Corporate Governance’. 
 The problem is twofold. If contingencies in the private sector are absent, there is no 
good working market system available anyway for the marketisation of public services. In that 
case we do not have even an alternative for good old bureaucratic provision. It does not make it 
any better if contingencies in the public sector are absent: market devices for public service 
delivery will certainly be misused for private objectives. In that case there ís a market, but the   
market cannot do better then bureaucracy, only worse. 
 
            
9. Concluding: the Ultimate Goal and Lessons Learned 
 
One could wonder: what should we do it for anyway, if marketisation of public services has to 
cope with so many so serious problems? Is this solution not worse then the original problem? 
Let us summarise shortly the arguments in favour. The main question is: who is in charge of 
public services, who is the boss? Is it the sponsoring politicians, is it the bureaucrats doing the 
job, or is it the citizens-clients who are supposed to be better off with than without? In a 
democratic political system the answer is clear: the citizens are in charge, or should be. Market 
devices give the power over public service delivery systems back to the citizens: 
‘empowerment’. In this respect they make government work better, make government do a 
better job. 
 What are the lessons to be leaned from experiences in West-Europe? To name a few. 
First, learn from the real experts: the practitioners in the field who have to do the job ‘hands on’, 
who have to deliver the public services to the customers. This implies no master plans and no 
grand designs, no top down but bottom up thinking and strategic decision-making on market 
devices for public services. Second, institutional variety in public service delivery: let there 
flourish a thousand flowers, because there are no perfect solutions and no panaceas. There is no 
public service delivery system as a ‘garment for all seasons’ (Hood, 1991). Third, dare to 
experiment, dare to allow for ‘trial and error’ and for learning by doing. One learns more from 
failure than from success stories and one can learn form each other! Fourth, market devices for 
public service delivery require scaling down and not scaling up. Depending on the presence or 
absence of scale (dis-)economies and externalities, Wallace Oates’ ‘Fundamental 
Decentralisation-Theorem’ should be applied: deliver public services at the lowest institutional 
level possible, unless. This refers to the ‘economics of decentralisation’ and ‘fiscal federalism’ 
(Oates, 1972). 
 Government is far much better in steering then in rowing the boat. Let others row the 
boat. This implies no the closure of government but a completely new role: that of process 
architect, facilitator and referee. The market helps government to do a better job: at the end of 
the day it is taxpayers’ money you know!                       
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